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In this paper, we show that consumers delay their buying to learn the unknown quality of a
product. Agents receive imperfect but informative signals about the unknown quality. Then,
each one simultaneously decides whether or not to buy the product in one of the two periods.
Consumers with moderate tastes will strategically delay their buying to the second period
even though they receive a good signal. They deduce the true quality by observing the mass
of first period buyers. We avoid equilibrium non-existence problem by using agents with
different private values.
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The inter-temporal price discrimination literature (e.g. Stokey (1979), Tirole (1989))
shows that a monopolist that faces heterogenous consumers has to decrease the price at
each period. The reason is that, after the high-taste consumers buy their unit demand and
exit the market, the ¯rm has no choice but to decrease the price to sell to the remaining
lower-taste consumers. However, this makes some consumers delay their buying to the next
period to take advantage of the lower prices. In this paper, by writing a model in which
consumers value not only their private taste but also the quality of the product, we show that
some consumers with moderate tastes delay their buying strategically to learn the unknown
quality of the good.
Social learning literature shows that agents can learn the unknown state by observing
the actions of others or the outcome of these actions. For example, Caplin and Leahy (1994)
show that if each agent receives a stream of private information (correlated with the true
state), then the rest can aggregate information and learn the unknown state by observing the
mass of agents taking a speci¯c action. Gunay (2008) shows that information aggregation is
possible in an in¯nite state world even when there is externality. In this paper, our agents
also aggregate information perfectly by observing the mass of ¯rst period buyers.
In our paper, we have a continuum of consumers who will decide whether or not to buy
one unit of durable \uncertain quality" good in one of the two periods. A consumer's utility
depends on her taste for quality and the good's unknown intrinsic quality. Consumers' taste
for quality is uniformly distributed and they each observe a private binary signal about the
quality. Agents with high enough taste will buy the good in the ¯rst period after receiving
a good signal. In the second period, the rest will deduce the quality by observing the mass
who bought the good during the ¯rst period. Since consumers know that uncertainty will be
resolved, the ones who have moderate preferences will strategically delay buying the good
to the second period.
In Caplin and Leahy (1994), (a continuum of) agents with extreme bad news know that
if they change their actions, the state will be revealed. Therefore, all these agents may have
incentive to delay their actions strategically. However, if they all delay their actions, then
the state will not be revealed. Hence, a symmetric equilibrium (even a mixed one) may not
exist. The reason for the possible equilibrium non-existence is that agents with extreme bad
news are all identical. In our paper, by using heterogenous consumers, we do not run into
the equilibrium non-existence problem. Some agents with high enough taste are better o®
by not delaying their action; hence, an equilibrium exists.
Our paper also falls into the strategic delay literature. In Hendricks and Kovenock (1989),
Aoyagi (1998), and Frisell (2003), two agents/¯rms receive signals of di®erent strength.
Agents delay their actions hoping that the other agent received a more informative signal in
the ¯rst two papers. In Frisell (2003), depending on externality, the ¯rm with less information
may move ¯rst or second. In our paper, agents with good news and high-enough tastes move
¯rst; that is, buy in the ¯rst period. Also, in our paper learning the state by observing a
¯nite number of agents' actions is impossible unlike the aforementioned papers.
1Gunay (2008b) analyzes the pricing decision of the ¯rms when consumers have strategic
delay incentives. However, in that paper, consumers do not have private information, and
hence, they do not aggregate information (unlike this paper).
2 THE MODEL
A continuum of consumers are indexed by their private taste parameters µi which is uniformly
distributed on [0;1]. Each consumer decides whether to buy a good of unknown quality
° 2 [0;1] in one of the two periods. The quality is drawn from a continuous distribution
F(°) on [0,1]; nobody observes the true quality e ° that will be ¯xed throughout the game.
A type µi consumer who owns the good will have an expected utility of µiE(°) at each
period where E denotes expectation. Note that each consumer's total valuation depends
on her private taste and the common parameter (quality) unlike the inter-temporal price
discrimination literature. We assume that our good is a durable good (no depreciation) so
a consumer who buys the good in the ¯rst period will derive 2µiE(°) total expected utility.1
If he does not buy the good, the normalized per period payo® to any type of consumer is












Learn e ° by observing the mass who bought
the good. Decide whether or not to buy.
Figure 1: TIMING OF THE GAME
The timing of the game is as follows. At the beginning of period 1, each agent receives
a (private) signal 1 with probability e ° and a (private) signal 0 with probability 1 ¡ e °.3
Therefore, signals are imperfect but informative. After receiving the signal, each consumer
updates her prior and then decide whether to buy the good at period 1. At period 2, after
observing the mass who bought the good in period 1, agents (who have not already bought)
decide whether or not to buy the good. They derive their payo®s and the game ends.
After getting a signal of 1 or 0, the consumers will have two di®erent posteriors which
we will denote as Fg(°) and Fb(°), respectively.
1We assume no discounting. If consumers discount the future, then waiting will be more costly; hence,
this will decrease the strategic delay incentive (but not change the qualitative results).
2The intertemporal price discrimination literature shows that consumers expect that prices will decrease;
hence, they delay their buying. In this paper, we want to show that even though there is no price e®ect,
some consumers delay their buying. Hence, we assume that the prices are ¯xed. Also note that we implicitly
assume price is ¯xed to zero. We could have had a slightly di®erent modelling approach and could have
assumed y = 0 but price is ¯xed to a positive value with the consumer's total surplus being equal to
2µiE(°) ¡ price. The results will not change with such a modelling approach.
3Signals are iid; however, we can make the signals dependent without changing any qualitative results.
22.1 Myopic Consumers
We will compare the myopic agents case with the strategic agents case. Our ¯rst proposition
proves that the myopic agents can aggregate information by observing m, the mass of ¯rst
period buyers. Note that they cannot delay buying strategically. We look for pure strategy
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in which consumers use threshold (cuto®) strategies.4 Before
proving our result, ¯rst we will state two assumptions.
Assumption 1:
R 1
0 °dFb(°) = Eb(°) < y
Assumption 2:
R 1
0 °dFg(°) = Eg(°) > y.
With Assumption 1, we ensure that even the agent who values the good most ex-ante,
i.e., µ = 1 agent, does not buy it after receiving a \zero" signal. In other words, anybody who




0 °dFb(°) = Eb(°) < y,
for all µ 2 [0;1]. Bad signals are powerful enough to change the decisions.5 Assumption 2
ensures that agent with µ = 1 will buy the good after receiving a \one" signal. This, in turn,
guarantees that a positive mass of agents will buy the good after receiving a \one" signal by
continuity.
Proposition 1 The agents who wait to decide in the second period will aggregate informa-







Proof We will ¯nd the threshold type c µM
1 that will be just indi®erent between buying
and delaying. The superscript M indicates that agents are myopic, the subscript 1 indicates
that the threshold level is for the ¯rst period. The threshold agent can be calculated from
the equation below. The left hand side is the payo® from buying in the ¯rst period (after





°dFg(°) = c µM
1 Eg(°) = y (2)
Since the payo® is increasing in type µ, a mass of (1 ¡ c µM
1 ) agents are potential buyers.
However, by assumption 1, any agent who receives a \zero" signal will not buy the good.
Only e ° of them will receive a one signal; therefore, only a mass of e °(1 ¡ c µM
1 ) will buy it (by
the law of large numbers). Then, anybody who observes the mass will learn the true quality
e ° since
m = e °(1 ¡ c µM
1 ) = e °(1 ¡
y
Eg(°)





4Because of assumption 1 and the fact that we use cuto® strategies, only the agents who are above a
threshold (cuto®) type and who received a signal 1 buy the good.
5Our results will hold by weakening Assumption 1 but this requires a little bit more work to prove the
result. For instance, Example 1 below shows a case in which Assumption 1 does not hold.
3Note that (1 ¡
y
Eg(°)) 2 (0;1) by Assumption 2, by y 2 (0;1]; and by F(:) being a
continuous distribution with having a support on [0;1].
Proposition 1 is a variant of Caplin and Leahy (1994) and Gunay (2008) since it proves
that perfect information aggregation is possible in the absence of strategic delay.
If agents were not myopic, we had to deal with strategic delay. The next subsection deals
with this issue.
2.2 Strategic Agents
We look for pure strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in which consumers use threshold
(cuto®) strategies. We will again ¯nd the threshold type b µS
1 that is indi®erent between
buying and delaying where the superscript S denotes strategic agents and subscript 1 denotes
the period. For this threshold type, the expected payo® from buying (in the ¯rst period) is
2 b µS
1Eg(°), after receiving a one-signal.
The payo® from delaying is as follows. The delaying agent will get a payo® of y in the
¯rst period. In the second period, after learning the e ° (proposition 2 will prove that agents
will learn e °), the b µS




, and hence, receives a payo® of




; and receives a payo® of e ° b µS
1.













1dFg(°) = 2 b µS
1Eg(°) (3)
We need the following assumptions that are modi¯ed from the myopic case. These
assumptions ensure that zero signals are powerful enough to make even the µ = 1 agent not
to buy the good in the ¯rst period and to make sure that some agents will buy the good in
















°dFg(°) < 2Eg(°) (5)
Proposition 2 (Information aggregation under strategic delay) Given assumption 3 and 4
hold, a mass of agents e °(1 ¡ b µS
1) will buy the good in the ¯rst period. The others will wait
for the second period to decide. Everyone will learn the true e ° in the beginning of the second
period by observing the mass of buying agents.
6The integrals are de¯ned only for the region [0;1]. In all other regions, the value of integrals are zero.
4Agents with high-enough tastes (and with good signal) buy the good without delaying.
The rest delay their actions and aggregate the privately held information by observing the
mass of buyers. Unlike Caplin and Leahy (1994), we do not have equilibrium non-existence
problem since our agents are heterogenous.
Let us contrast our result with the intertemporal price discrimination literature, (e.g.
Stokey (1979) and Tirole (1989)) which explains consumers' waiting by the \price decrease
expectation" motives. In this note, we explain consumers' waiting by the strategic delay
motives; i.e., consumers wait to learn more about the unknown quality. The di®erence
between this paper and Gunay (2008b) is the fact that the latter one does not have any
information aggregation feature since consumers do not receive signals.
Example 1 and Figure 2 show that agents with moderate tastes will delay their buying




in the ¯rst period
Myopic agents
do not buy









buy without delaying 1
Figure 2: How do di®erent types decide after receiving a good signal in the ¯rst period?
Example 17 Let F(°) be a beta distribution with parameters ® = 1;¯ = 1. Let y = 1
4.
For the myopic agents, the cuto® type that is indi®erent between buying and delaying in the
















since the agents who receive a good signal will have a beta posterior with parameters
® = 2;¯ = 1 with Eg(°) = 2
3.



























The unique answer to the solution of equation 7 is b µS
1 = 0:41941. Then, agents who
receive good signal in the range [0:317;0:419] will delay their buying strategically. By the
law of large numbers, this mass is equal to (0:41941 ¡ 0:375)e ° (where e ° will be learned by
observing the total mass of buyers in the ¯rst period.)
7In this example, the assumption Eb(°) < y does not hold but this does not have any e®ect on the
threshold levels.
53 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In a setup in which consumers decide whether and when to buy a good of unknown quality,
we show that consumers with moderate tastes delay their buying strategically to the next
period. Unlike the intertemporal price discrimination literature, we show that some agents
wait strategically to learn the unknown quality. Our other result is that agents can still
aggregate information even after some agents delay their buying.
We admit that ¯xing the price is a limitation of this paper; however, this is an intended
choice to show that consumers delay their buying for reasons other than the price expectation
motives. An extension of this paper should investigate how ¯rms will choose their prices when
consumers learn unknown quality by aggregating privately held information by observing the
sales number in the previous period.
4 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2 If we can show that there is a unique threshold type b µS
1 who is
indi®erent between buying and delaying, then everyone will learn the true e °. This is because
the mass m who buys will be equal to e °(1¡ b µS
1), which implies e ° = m
(1¡c µS
1 ) (by assumption 3
and by the law of large numbers).



















If we can show that G(0) < 0, G(1) > 0 and the derivative of this function is positive,
then we can conclude that G(:) has a unique root which is b µS
1 by the setup of G function. It is
straightforward to see from equation 8 that G(0) = ¡2y < 0. G(1) > 0 holds by assumption
4.


























































°dFg(°) > 0 (11)
Hence, the function G(:) = 0 has a unique root which is b µS
1. Since agents can calculate
b µS
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